Violations of Uniform Partner Ranking Condition in Two-way Flow Strict Nash Networks by Charoensook, Banchongsan
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Violations of Uniform Partner Ranking
Condition in Two-way Flow Strict Nash
Networks
Banchongsan Charoensook
27 January 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/77961/
MPRA Paper No. 77961, posted 29 March 2017 10:23 UTC
VIOLATIONS OF UNIFORM PARTNER RANKING CONDITION IN
TWO-WAY FLOW STRICT NASH NETWORKS
Banchongsan Charoensook ∗1
1Department of International Business, Keimyung University, Republic of Korea
March 27, 2017
Abstract– The paper of Charoensook ((2015), [3]) extends
the results of the original model of two-way flow infor-
mation sharing network of Bala and Goyal ((2000),[1]),
given that a condition called Uniform Partner Ranking is
satisfied. In this technical note, we study what happen to
these results when this condition is violated. By providing
some examples, we conclude that a certain degree of agent
homogeneity needs to exist in order that the results of [3]
remains satisfied.
Index Terms– Network Formation, Strict Nash Network,
Two-way Flow Network, Branching Network, Agent Het-
erogeneity, Information Network
I Introduction
A game-theoretic model of network formation assume that
networks are form based upon self-interest agents who choose
to establish costly connections or links with each other in or-
der to exchange some benefits (eg., his private information) .
The original two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000,
[1]), BG henceforth, further has in mind a situation in which
each agent pays for all information that he wishes to acquire
by (i) solely bears the cost of link establishment used for com-
munication, and (ii) promises to share his own private piece of
information with others. Since this model assumes agent ho-
mogeneity, it has inspired many extensions that allow for the
existence of agent heterogeneity. An interesting paper in this
literature is that of Charoensook (2015, [3]) that generalizes the
original results of BG and that of [4] and [2]. Importantly, the
generalization of [3] is achieved through imposing a condition
called Uniform Partner Ranking on the characteristics of the
structure of link establishment cost in order that the shapes of
SNNs can be predicted.
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Naturally, this raises the question of what happen when this
condition - Uniform Parter Ranking - is violated. In this tech-
nical note, we contribute to this literature by proposing some
answers to this question. Specifically, we provide some exam-
ples that show that (i) the results of [3] can still hold even if
the Uniform Partner Ranking condition, UPR henceforth, is vi-
olated, (ii) only partial results still hold, and (iii) even partial
results do not hold. Through these examples we conclude that
a certain degree of agent homogeneity needs to exist in order
that the results of [3] remain to hold.
We provide a brief introduction to related literature here. The
literature in game-theoretic model of network formation is in-
vented by two papers - [7] and [1]. These two papers are quite
different in terms of basic assumptions on the nature of benefits
that each agent possesses. On one hand, [7] assumes the ben-
efits that each agent possess may not necessarily be nonrival.
Therefore, a link is formed and the benefits are shared only if
both agents agree. For an elaborate review of the literature of
network formation, [6] and [5] provide a through introduction.
On the other hand, the original two-flow flow of network for-
mation of BG assumes that each agent owns a unique piece of
private information that is non-rival in the sense that each does
not mind sharing his information with other agents. He can in-
dependently choose to establish a link with any other agent in
the network by bearing a link establishment cost on his own.
In this paper, Nash and Strict Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies are adopted to predict the appearance of equilibrium net-
works. which are called Nash networks and Strict Nash net-
works, SNNs henceforth, respectively. An important assump-
tion is that Link establishment cost is assumed to be identical
across all agents. Thus, agent homogeneity is assumed in BG.
Several works in the literature extend this BG model to cases
at which link formation cost is heterogeneous across agents.
How this heterogeneity is imposed, though, varies among exist-
ing literature. A paper that is of our interest is that of Charoen-
sook (2015, [2]) since it establish a result that generalize the
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models of [1], [4], and [2]. This generalized result assumes that
link formation cost satisfies a condition called Uniform Partner
Ranking. Simply put, this condition states that agents may pay
different levels of link formation cost. However, each of them
has the same ranking in terms of partner preference. That is,
if an agent i finds that linking to j is cheaper than linking to
k, all other agents find likewise. This condition results in the
fact that every non-empty component of an SNN has at most
one agent who receives more than one link. Our paper, there-
fore, contributes to the literature by investigating what happen
to SNNs when this Uniform Partner Ranking is violated.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections,
model specifications and the definition of SNN as an equilib-
rium prediction criterion is introduced. We then proceed to
the main results section by giving examples of Strict Nash net-
works that violate the Uniform Partner Ranking condition. Fi-
nally, in the conclusion section we discuss on the insights from
these examples.
II The Model
II.I Basic Setting
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of all agents in the network.
Consider an agent i ∈ N , i establishes a link with an agent j
by paying the link formation cost ci,j . The incentive of i is to
acquire the information of j. Notice that ci,j depends on both
the identity of i and j. This is where agent heterogeneity is
introduced in our model. Whenever a link to j is established
by i, we say that i is a link sender and j is a link receiver.
Furthermore, we say that i accesses j.
Individual’s strategy and network representation. Let
gi,j = 1 represents the fact that i accesses j and gi,j = 0
represents the fact that i does not access j. A strategy of i,
represented by gi, is gi = {gi,1, ..., gi,i−1...gi,n}. A strategy
profile is, therefore, g = (g1, ..., gn). Since all links form the
network, we set g also represents the network. Graphically, we
let an agent i be presented by a node i. A point from node i to
node j then represents the fact that i accesses j
Structure of information flow. Information flow is two-way
in the sense that if i has an entry to the information j then j
also has an entry to the information of i. i has an entry to
the information of j whenever a path between i and j exists.
Formally, let g¯ij = max {gij , gji}. A path between i and j or
ij−path in a network g is then defined as a sequence Pi,j (g) =
g¯i,j1 , g¯j1j2 , ..., g¯jmj such that each element in this sequence is
1. If an ij− path exists, i is said to observe j.
Individual’s payoff. Let Nd (i; g¯) and N (i; g¯) be the set of
all agents that i accesses and observes respectively. Let Vi,j be
the value of information of j that i receives. Then, the payoff
of i in g is defined as:
(1a)Πi (g) =
∑
j∈N(i;g)
Vi,j −
∑
j∈Nd(i;g)
ci,j
Graph-theoretic notations. Consider a network g. A net-
work is connected if i observes j for for all i, j ∈ N and i 6= j.
A subnetwork g′ is a subset of a network g, ie., g′ ⊂ g. A
component of a network is a subnetwork that is maximally con-
nected. That is, i observe j if and only if i and j belong to the
same component. A network is said to be minimal if every path
between i and j is unique. That is, there exists one and only
one path through which i observes j. An agent who observes
no other agent is said to be isolated. If all agents in the network
are isolated, the network is said to be an empty network.
Bi and branching networks. The definitions of these terms
are borrowed from [2]. A branching network is a minimally
connected such that there is a unique agent i who receives no
link and every other agent receives exactly one link. That is,
a branching network rooted at i is a minimally connected net-
work such that |Ii (g) |= 0 and |Ij (g) |= 1 for all j 6= i and
j ∈ N (I and O should be defined somewhere !!!).
To define Bi network, we first introduce the following no-
tations. Let QN ′ = N ′ ∪ j ∈ N |apathfromitojexist (a
path needs to be defined somewhere!!!). A point contrabasis
of a network g, B(g), is a minimal set of players such that
QB(g) = N . Intuitively, QB(g) carries the intuition that there
is a set of agents that can be used to observe all other agents
through the existence of the path between an agent in this set
and an agent outside of this set. An i-point contrabasis, Bi(g),
is a point contrabasis of g such that all players j ∈ Bi(g)
accesses i. Finally, A network g is a Bi-network if |Ii(g)|2,
|Ij(g)|< 2 for all j 6= i, and Ii(g) = Bi(g).
II.II The Definitions of Nash Network
Consider a network g. Let g−i be the set of all links in g that
i does not establish. That is, g−i = g\gi. Put differently, a
union of g−i and gi is exactly the network g. These notations
are used to define the following terms.
Definition 1 (Best response). A strategy gi is a best response
of i to g−i if
Πi (i; gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ Πi
(
i; g′i ⊕ g−i
)
, for all g′i ∈ Gi
Definition 2 (Nash network). A network g is a Nash network if
gi is a best response to g−i for every agent i ∈ N .
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Moreover, if the inequality is strict for all i ∈ N , Nash
network is a Strict Nash Network. We abbreviate the term Strict
Nash Network by SNN .
II.III Cost Structure and the Uniform Parter
Ranking Condition
A cost structure C is defined as a collection of all link formation
costs C = {ci,j : i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. We use this definition to
define the following two terms, which are borrowed from [3].
Definition 3 (Better Partner). Consider a set X ⊂ N and
agents j, k ∈ X, j is at least as good a partner as k with
respect to the set X if ci,j ≤ ci,k for any i ∈ X, i 6= j 6= k.
Moreover, if the inequality is strict then j is said to be a better
partner than k with respect to the set X.
That is, if j is at least as good a partner as k with respect
to set of agents X, then every agent in the set X finds that
accessing j is at least as costly as accessing k. Put differently,
all agents in X ‘rank’ j as a preferred partner than k in terms of
costliness of link establishment. The Uniform Partner Ranking
condition below simply adds that the set X is exactly N and
that all agents can be ranked.
Definition 4 (Uniform Partner Ranking). A cost structure C is
said to satisfy Uniform Partner Ranking condition if for any
distinct pair j, k ∈ N it holds true that j is at least as good
a partner as k or k is at least as a good a partner as j with
respect to the set N .
Intuitively, since all agents can be ranked if C satisfies the
UPR condition, there exists an agent who is ranked ‘first’ in
the sense that he is at least as good a partner as every other
agent. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 5 (Common Best Partner). An agent i∗ is said to be
Common Best Partner if i∗ is at least as good a partner as i′
with respect to the set N , where i′ 6= i∗.
III Main Results
III.I Case 1: UPR is violated but the results of
Charoensook 2015 still hold
1 3
5
2
6
7
8
9
4
10 11
Figure 1: Example 1
agents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 - 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 20 20 20
2 0.1 - 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 20 20 20
3 0.1 0.2 - 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 20 20 20
4 0.1 0.2 0.3 - 0.4 0.5 0.6 20 20 20
5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 - 0.5 0.6 20 20 20
6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 - 0.6 20 20 20
7 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 - 20 20 20
8 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 - 0.3 0.4
9 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 0.4 - 0.5
10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 0.5 0.6 -
Table 1: Cost Structure for Example 1
Example 1. Let Vi,j = 1 for all i, j ∈ N and i 6= j. Let the
cost structure be represented by the above table, where each
row represents an agent i, each column represents an agent
j, and each number in the table represents the cost ci,j . This
cost structure divides agents into two groups, where agents 1
to 7 belong to group I and agents 8 to 10 belongs to group II.
Accordingly, the table is divided into four quadrants at agent 7.
Observe further that link formation costs between agents from
the same group are at most 0.6, while the link formation costs
between agents across groups are set at 20. Hence, accessing
an agent from the other group is never a best response. This
cost structure, therefore, is reminiscent of the insider-outsider
model of [4]. A major difference, though, is that in this example
link formation cost ci,j is not identical among agents in the
same group.
It is easy to show that this cost structure violates UPR, yet
every non-empty SNNs consists of non-empty components that
are either branching or Bi. To show the violation, consider
agent 1 and agent 8. We can see that c1,2 < c1,7 but c8,2 > c8,7.
Therefore, UPR is violated. Indeed, this is due to the fact that
agents 1 and 8 belong to different groups. Observe further
that Vi,j = 1 and ci,j = 20 for any i, j that do not belong
to the same group. Therefore, agents that do not belong to the
same group will not establish links with each other. On the con-
trary, it is easy to see that links between agents from the same
group are established since Vi,j = 1 but ci,j =< 1 for any i, j
that belong to the same group. Consequently, it is guaranteed
that every SNN has exactly two non-empty components, each is
composed of agents from the same group.
Finally, it remains to be shown that each non-empty compo-
nent of SNN is either branching or Bi. First, observe that UPR
is not violated if we consider only agents from the same group.
Indeed, all agents in Group I (II) have agent 1 (agent 8) as their
common best partner, and each agent i finds that ci,j < ci,j+1
for any i, j, j + 1 that belong to the same group. Therefore,
inside each component, UPR is not violated. As a result, it can
be predicted that each component of SNN is either branching
or Bi. Figure 1 above illustrates an SNN based upon this cost
structure.
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agent 1 2 3 4 5
1 - 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2
2 0.1 - 0.2 0.3 0.4
3 0.1 0.4 - 0.3 0.2
4 0.1 0.2 0.3 - 0.4
5 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 -
Table 2: Cost Structure for Example 2
13
5
2
4
Figure 2: Example 2
Example 2. Let the cost structure be represented by the above
table and let Vi,j = 1 for all i, j ∈ N and i 6= j. In this
example, UPR is violated because c4,2 = 0.2 < c4,3 = 0.3
but c5,2 = 0.4 > c5,3 = 0.2. However, we have an SNN that
is B1. It is easy to see why UPR is violated but SNN remains
a Bi network. First, observe that every agent (except agent
1) agrees that agent 1 is the common best partner. Therefore,
agent 2 and agent 3 access agent 1 in this SNN.
III.II Case 2: UPR is violated and the results of
Charoensook 2015 do not hold
agents 1 2 3 4
1 - 7 8 9
2 0.1 - 5 5
3 0.1 5 - 5
4 5 5 0.1 -
Table 3: Cost Structure for Example 3
13 24
Figure 3: Example 3
Example 3. Let the cost structure be represented by the above
table and let Vi,j = 1 for all i, j ∈ N and i 6= j. In this
example, UPR is violated because c1,2 = 7 < c1,3 = 8 but
c4,2 = 5 < c4,3 = 0.1. Indeed, agent 2 and 3 agree that agent
1 is the best partner. However, agent 4 has agent 3 as his best
partner. This results in the fact that agent 4 accesses agent 3
in this SNN, while both agent 2 and agent 3 access agent 1. It
is easy to see that this SNN is neither branching nor Bi. First,
it is not branching because there is no agent who receives no
link. Second, it is not Bi because a point contrabasis of this
network is the set {2, 3, 4} so that agent 2 cannot be a 2−point
contrabasis of this network.
III.III Case 3: UPR is violated but the results of
Charoensook 2015 partially hold
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 - 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 20 20 20 20
2 0.1 - 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 20 20 20 20
3 0.1 0.2 - 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 20 20 20 20
4 0.1 0.2 0.3 - 0.4 0.5 0.6 20 20 20 20
5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 - 0.5 0.6 20 20 20 20
6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 - 0.6 20 20 20 20
7 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 - 20 20 20 20
8 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 - 7 8 9
9 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 7 - 8 9
10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 7 8 - 9
11 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 7 8 9 -
Table 4: Cost Structure for Example 4
1 3
5
2
6
7
4
810 911
Figure 4: Example 4
Example 4. The cost structure of this example is simply a com-
bination of Example 1 and Example 3. Observe that the link
formation costs of agent 1 to agent 7 is identical to that of ex-
ample 1 and that the link formation costs of agent 8 to agent
11 is identical to that of example 3 (agent 1 to agent 4 in Ex-
ample 3). We therefore divide agents into two groups, where
agent 1 to agent 7 belong to the group I and agent 8 to agent
11 belong to group II. Observe further that link formation cost
ci,j is set to be 20 if i and j belong to different groups. Similar
to Example 1, we have an SNN that consists of two non-empty
components, each is composed of agents from the same group.
Moreover, the shape of each component is precisely that of Ex-
ample 1 and Example 3. Consequently, we have an SNN such
that one of its components is Bi and the other is neither branch-
ing or Bi. This entails that UPR is violated and the results of
Charoensook 2015 hold only partially.
IV Discussion and Conclusion
This paper shows various effects of the violation of UPR
condition on Strict Nash networks. Let us summarize these
effects as follows:
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1. If it can be predicted that SNN consists of multiple com-
ponents, and that we know which agent belongs to which
component, the shape of each component depends merely
on the cost structure pertaining to agents in this compo-
nent. This insight can be seen from Example 1 and Exam-
ple 4.
2. Following the first effect, whether the cost structure of all
agents violates UPR or not does not matter. Indeed, if
UPR is not violated when considering the cost structure
pertaining to agents in the same component, the results of
Charoensook 2015 still holds. Alternatively, it may par-
tially hold in the sense that the shape of some components
are predicted to be branching or Bi due to the fact that
UPR is not violated inside that each of these components.
This insight is illustrated in Example 1 and Example 4.
3. Even if the cost structure pertaining to agents in the same
component does violate UPR, SNN can still be Bi. This
insight is seen in Example 2.
4. In contrast to (3), there exists also cases such that a com-
ponent of SNN is neither branching or Bi when the cost
structure pertaining to agents in the same component vio-
lates UPR. This insight is seen in Example 3.
At this point, we further provide an important observation
from point (3) and point (4) above. To do so, we first remark
that in both Example 2 and Example 3 UPR is violated, yet
only SNN in Example 3 remains Bi while SNN in Example
is neither Bi nor branching. What explain this difference? In
Example 2, we have that all agents (except agent 1) agree that
agent 1 is their best common partner. However, this form of
agreement between agents does not exist in Example 3, where
agent 4 does not agree with agent 2 and agent 3 that agent 1
is the best partner. Therefore, we remark that some forms of
agreement between all agents inside the component need to ex-
ist in order the results of the results of Charoensook 2015 - a
component of SNN being branching or Bi - remains to hold.
Indeed, a similar argument is also applied to point 1 and 2
above, which illustrate that what matters is whether UPR is vi-
olated inside each component rather than the violation of UPR
when considering all agents in the network. Since UPR in a
component requires that all agents in the component agree on
which agent is superior as a partner than which in terms link
formation cost, one can interpret that some forms of agreement
between all agents inside the component need to exist in order
the results of the results of Charoensook 2015 - a component
of SNN being branching or Bi - remains to hold.
Finally, we remark that these examples raise a question of
what a necessary and sufficient condition for a component of
SNN to be branching or Bi is. We leave this question as a
research to be explored in the future.
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